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GROWTH IN THE CONSTITUTION AN4D CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW SINCE THE DECISION OF THE CASE.
OF WEST COAST HOTEL VS. PARRISH
HUGH EvANDER WILLISf
With the decision of the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Par-
rish,' there began a new period in United States constitutional
history. This period resembles the constitutional period from
1910 to 1922, when Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Hughes
were the dominant members of the court; and the period from
the Civil War to the late eighties, when Justice Miller and
Chief Justices Waite and Taney dominated the court; and to
some extent, the period from 1801 to the Civil War, when the
court was dominated by Chief Justice Marshall. It differs
radically from the constitutional period which extended from
1922 to 1937, when Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland
and Van Devanter dominated the court; and the period from
the late eighties to 1910, when Justices Field, Bradley, Peck-
ham and Chief Justice Fuller dominated the court. This new
period introduced remarkable changes into our Constitution
and constitutional law. This is shown by the fact that more
than forty prior cases of the Supreme Court were overruled
by over thirty new Supreme Court cases, and by the fact that
where prior cases were not overruled new cases introduced a
great many new'principles. These changes were so great that
all sorts of things which had been unconstitutional prior to
1937 became constitutional after 1937. So great were these
changes 'that many prominent lawyers and other prominent
persons in the United States were filled with alarm and pub-
licly proclaimed that all of our Constitution was being over-
thrown. The reason for this feeling was that most of the cases
overruled had been cases in the prior period in which the
opinions had been written either by Justice Butler, Justice
TA. B. Yankton College, 1897, A. M. 1899, LL. D. 1925; LL. B. Uni-
versity of Minnesota, 1901, LL. M. 1902. At present Professor of Law,
Indiana University School of Law.
1300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703 (1937).
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McReynolds, Justice Sutherland, or Justice Van Devanter.
Many lawyers were well acquainted with Supreme Court de-
cisions no further back than this time, and it is not surprising
that they thought that all the constitutional law they knew
was being wiped away. But when the work of the Supreme
Court since 1937 is compared with the work of the Supreme
Court from the beginning of United States history, it is very
easy to see that there is no cause for alarm. As a matter of
fact, the court in this last period did not work any more radical
changes in our Constitution than did the justices in the imme-
diately preceding period. And for some strange reason law-
yers and other people were not filled with alarm at the work
of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter.
All that the Supreme Court has done in the last few years has
been to undo the work of the Supreme Court in this prior
period-to terminate the dominancy of Justices Butler, Mc-
Reynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter, and to make the dis-
sents of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Clark, Stone and Cardozo
the doctrines of the court.
Yet the Constitution and the constitutional law which we
now have are so different from the Constitution and the con-
stitutional law which we had during the dominancy of Justices
Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter, that care-
ful consideration should be given to the changes which have
occurred, and the new principles and doctrines which have
been established. In doing this we will divide our discussion
up into topics corresponding with the great fundamental doc-
trines of our Constitution.
Sovereignty
One great doctrine of the United States Constitution is the
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people as a whole. There
has been no new growth in this doctrine since 1937. The
problem of what is the meaning of sovereignty, and who,
under the United States Constitution is sovereign, has prob-
ably been finally solved. -At any rate, the Supreme Court did
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not do any further work on this subject in the period we are
discussing. The doctrine was almost placed in our Constitu-
tion by the Constitutional Convention in the preamble to the
Constitution, but it required a great deal of work by the
United States Supreme Court before it became a fundamental
part of our Constitution. This work was begun by Chief
Justice Jay,2 continued by Chief Justice Marshall, 3 and was
finally completed by Justice Holmes and his associates who
defined sovereignty as the power to make laws, 4 and the na-
ture and scope of sovereignty, as without limitations.5 Since
Jay and Marshall and Lincoln and the Civil War had settled
the question of where sovereignty in the United States re-
sides, i. e., in the people as a whole, the topic of sovereignty
needs little, if any, further elucidation.
Amnendability
What has been said about sovereignty will more or less
apply to amendability. The original Constitution covered so
many features of the amending power, and where the original
Constitution did not cover the whole of the subject, the Su-
preme Court has, through the years, filled in so many of the
omissions, that very little work remains to be done, and the
Supreme Court did very little work on this topic in the period
under discussion. However, it did render one decision, Cole-
man vs. Miller,6 in which the Supreme Court held that the
question of how long a proposed amendment continues to be
2 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793.). The inmu-
nity from suit given by the Eleventh Amendment cannot be waived by
the Attorney General. Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 65
Sup. Ct. 347, 89 L. Ed. 372 -(1945).
3 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
4 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 29 Sup.
Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886).
5National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486, 64 L.
Ed. -946 (1920); United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 51 Sup. Ct.
220, 75 L. Ed. 640 (1931).
6307 U. S. 433, 59 Sup. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1365 (1939).
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pending is a political question for Congress; and in doing so
it overruled a prior case of Dillon vs. Gloss.7 This case also
made the question of whether ratification and rejection are
final acts a political one.
Universal Citizenship and Suffrage
The doctrine of universal citizenship and suffrage has been
so fully worked out by the formal Fourteenth, Fifteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments, and the work of the United States
Supreme Court, that not very much remains to be done to this
doctrine. But in this last period the Supreme Court rendered
a few decisions on these topics and on the topics of privileges
and immunities of the United States and state citizens. In
Perkins vs. Elg,8 the court held that a child born in the United
States does not lose his United States citizenship by the ex-
patriation of his parents. In the case of Schneiderman vs.
United States," it held that membership in a communistic
party at the time of naturalization is not a ground for later
cancellation of naturalization granted to a person. In the case
of Edwards vs. California,10 four concurring judges held that
the privilege of passing from state to state is a privilege of
a United States citizen, and, while the majority of the court
put its decision on another ground of commerce, it did not
say that it was not also a United States privilege and im-
munity. In Madden vs. Commonwealth of Kentucky," the
Supreme Court held that the privilege of carrying on business
beyond the lines of a state, for example, to make a deposit of
money in banks, is not a privilege of a United States citizen.
This was contra to the case of Colgate vs. Harvey, decided in
the prior constitutional period, and therefore, this case was
overruled. The first decision, consequently, had the effect
of restoring the meaning of the United States privileges and
,256 U. S. 368,41 Sup. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921).
8307 U. S: 325, 59 Sup. Ct. 884, 83 L. Ed. 1320 (1939).
9320 U. S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333,87 L. Ed. 1796 (1943).
'0314 U. S. 160, 62 Sup. Ct. 164,86 L. Ed. 119 (1941).
1309 U. S. 83, 60 Sup. Ct. 406, 84 L. Ed. 590 (1940).
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immunities clause to that given to it by the Slaughterhouse
Cases12 in the period of Justice Miller. In this .period the
Supreme Court also overruled the case of Grovey vs. Town-
send.13 It did this in the cases of the United States vs. Classic,
and Smith vs. Allwright.14  Grovey vs. Townsend had held
that the Democratic party in Texas was not an agency of the
state, and, therefore, that the political party was not for-
bidden by the Constitution from discriminating against Ne-
groes. The Classic case gave the Federal Government the
power to regulate primary elections as well as regular elec-
tions; thereby overruling the Newberry case. 1 The Allwright
case made a political party an agency of the state; and,
thereby, made the constitutional limitation against discrimina-
tion apply. Since the Classic case had already given the
Federal Government power to regulate primary elections, it
follows that the Federal Government has the power to pre-
vent discrimination against Negroes by a political party.
Separation of Powers
It cannot be said that the Supreme Court has finished its
work on this doctrine, at least, if we expect the court to make
the doctrine a coherent and scientific one. The original Con-
stitution put this doctrine into our Constitution in spite of
the fact that it did not expressly say so. About all that the
original Constitution did was to establish three branches of
government, name certain specific powers given to each
branch, and to introduce its scheme of checks and balan6es.
Most of the work of rationalizing this subject has been done
by the Supreme Court. It has found the following character-
istics of our doctrine of separation of powers: (1) three
branches of government, the executive branch including the
1216 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872).
13295 U. S. 45, 55 Sup. Ct. 622, 79 L. Ed. 1292 (1935).
i4United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed.
1368 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 64 Sup. Ct. 757, 88-L.
Ed. 987 (1944). But cf. Screws v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 1031
(U. S. 1945).
15Newberry v. United States, 256 U. -S. 232, 41 Sup. Ct. 469, 65 L.
Ed. 913 (1921).
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administrative branch; (2) three functions of government
corresponding to the three branches of government; (3) an
allocation of powers or functions to the various branches, but
without any scientific allocation of legislative powers to the
legislative branch, or judicial powers to the judicidl branch,
or executive powers to the executive branch. (The scheme
of checks and balances of the original Constitution departed
from any such allocation, and the Supreme Court has per-
mitted even greater confusion of powers.) ; (4) a prohibition
on the delegation of its powers by any one branch to another
branch, or to another agent of government, or to a private
individual, except in the case of local self-government; (5)
a prohibition on the- commingling of all of the functions of
government in any one branch of government, except in the
case of administrative commissions; and (6) the supremacy
of the Supreme Court over the other branches of the Federal
Government instead of a status of equality. The most ex-
asperating and unscientific part of this doctrine is the con-
fusion of powers caused by the way they have been allocated
to the various branches of government. Yet if any improve-
ment in this situation is ever to occur, it has not occurred in
the period which we are now studying. Very little in the way
of the change of the doctrine has occurred in this period. In
the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough,16 the court held that an
income tax upon the salary of a federal judge is not a diminu-
tion of his salary contrary to the Constitution, and to this
extent enlarged the taxing power of the legislative branch.
In deciding this case the Supreme Court expressly overruled
the earlier case of Miles v. Graham,17 and impliedly overruled
the case of Evans v. Gore.1 8 In spite of the rule against dele-
gation of authority, the Supreme Court, in the case of Shields
v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad -Company,19 permitted Con-
16307 U. S. 277, 59 Sup. Ct. 838, 83 L. Ed. 1289 (1939).
17268 U. S. 501, 45 Sup..Ct. 601, 69 L. Ed. 1067 (1925) (opinion by
Justice McReynolds).
18253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550, 64 L. Ed. 887 (1920) (opinion by
Justice Van Devanter).
19305 U. S. 177, 59 Sup. Ct. 160, 83 L. Ed. 111 (1938).
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gress to delegate to the Interstate Commerce Commission the
power to determine whether a particular electric railroad was
an interurban railroad; and in United States v. Rock Royal
Corporation,20 the Supreme Court permitted Congress to dele-
gate to the Secretary of Agriculture the power to determine
the details of a legislative scheme. The Supreme Court, in
this period, also tended to put a limitation of self-restraint
upon its own power of judicial review.21
Supremacy of the Supreme Court
When the Supreme Court established its supremacy over
the other branches of the Federal Government, it did so im-
portant a thing that it really created a new doctrine of consti-
tutional law. This doctrine is now so great that it gives the
Supreme Court supremacy, not only over the lower Federal
courts, but over the other branches of the Federal Govern-
ment, and over the branches of the state governments. Its
power over state courts is so great that state courts have
practically become inferior courts in the Federal system. In
the case of diversity of citizenship and where the amount in-
volved is in excess of $3000.00, the Supreme Court's su-
premacy relates to every possible kind of question. And in
connection with this power the Supreme Court at first built
up a Federal common law of its own, differing from the gen-
eral common law of the states in which the lower federal
courts sat. Aside from diversity cases, the United States
Supreme Couit has supremacy over federal questions, but it
has this power whether the Federal question comes up in a
lower Federal court ($3000.00) or in a state court; and here
also the Supreme Court followed the practice of following its
own rule instead of any rule of the state courts. In the nine-
ties the Supreme Court extended its supremacy so as to include
not only protection to personal liberty and equality as to
20307 U. S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed. 1446 (1939). And to the
Court of Claims the power to legislate after unfavorable adjudication.
Pope v. United States, 323 U. S. 1, 65 Sup. Ct. 16, 89 L. Ed. 5 (1944).
2 1See cases infra under the topic of "Supremacy of the Supreme
'Court."
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matters of procedure and jurisdiction, but also as to matters
of substance; so that it acquired the power to determine in a
negative fashion what changes in social control can be estab-
lished by either Congress or state legislatures.
This continued to be constitutional law in the United States
in the period under consideration, except that the Supreme
Court made a few slight modifications of the doctrine which
has just been discussed. In the case of Erie Railroad Com-
pany v. Tompkins,22 the Supreme Court reversed the case of
Swift v. Tyson,2 3 and in doing so, held that in diversity cases
the Supreme Court will cease to make its own common law,
but will hereafter apply the common law of that state in which
the particular court is sitting. The Supreme Court thought
that the rule of Swift v. Tyson created a great deal of un-
certainty, but it is possible that the case .of Erie Railroad
Company v. Tompkins has created another kind of uncertainty
as bad as was ever created by Swift v. Tyson. In spite of
this new reversal of policy (1) the Federal courts may still
decide, in diversity cases, the meaning of a state constitution
or statute where there is no state decision, or state decisions
conflict; (2) Federal courts may decide the state common
law where there are no state decisions, or the decisions are
conflicting, or the decisions of one state differ from those of
another state; (3) the Federal courts may decide as to their
own law in case of Federal questions ;24 (4) the rule of the
Erie case does not apply to equity cases; (5) the rule of the
Erie case does not apply to questions of the impairment of
the obligations of a contract; (6) the rule of the Erie case
does not apply to matters of procedure;2a (7) and to some
other miscellaneous matters constantly being newly discov-
ered. The Supreme Court in this period also limited the
22304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82'L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
2316 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842).
24Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 59 Sup. Ct. 155, 8& L. Ed. 119 (1938);
Nat. Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U. S. 454, 65 Sup. Ct.
354, 89 L. Ed. 386 (1945) (government checks).
25Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208, 60 Sup. Ct. 201,
84 L. Ed. 196 (1939).
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power of the Federal courts to punish for contempt to cases
so near geographically as to obstruct the administration of
justice and not to those casually obstructing ;26 and for deter-
mining when there is a contempt the court adopted the clear
and present danger test.2  In this period the Supreme Court
also put a limitation of self-restraint on itself against judicial
review so as to limit its power over the other branches of
government. It did this first, by making some matters po-
litical questions28 and leaving the decision dither to the execu-
tive or legislative branch of government, and second, by giv-
ing finality to the findings of fact of administrative com-
missions.2 9
Dual Form of Government
The doctrine of dual form of government was put in our
Constitution by Chief Justice John Marshall and he and other
justices have developed most of the principles found in this
doctrine, but they used a lot of matters found in the original
Constitution in connection with the powers of the various
branches of the Federal Government. By the dual form of
government there was created a Federal Government and the
state government, each with powers of its own and each in-
dependent of the other, except as the doctrine of Federal
supremacy made the Federal Government supreme over the
26Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 85 L. Ed. 1172
(1941).
27Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192
(1941).
28See supra Amendability, etc.
29Elmhurst Cemetery Co. of Joliet v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 300 U. S. 37, 57 Sup. Ct. 324, 81 L. Ed. 491 (1937); Federal
Power Commission v. Pacific Po'wer & Light Co., 307 U. S. 156, 59 Sup.
Ct. 766, 83 L. Ed. 1180 (1939); Federal Communications Commission
v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 60 Sup. Ct. 437, 84 L. Ed.
656 (1940); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381,
60 Sup. Ct. 907, 84 L. Ed. 1263 (1940); Dobson v. Commissioner of
Internal- Revenue, 320 U. S. 489, 64 Sup. Ct. 239, 88 L. Ed. 248 (1943);
Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union, 323 U. S. 72, 65 Sup. Ct.
142, 89 L. Ed. 108 (1944); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Scot-
tish American Inv. Co., 323 U. S. 119, 65 Sup. Ct. 169, 89 L. Ed. 97
(1944).
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states. Under this dual form of government the Federal Gov-
ernment and the state government have jurisdiction over the
same people and within the same territory. The dual form of
government does not apply to our foreign relations. In this
field the states have no powers.30
Federal Supremacy
This doctrine was created by Chief Justice Marshall in his
great decision in McCulloch v. Maryland. He held both that
the Federal Government had many implied powers, and that
it had power to tax state instrumentalities when states did not
have the power to tax Federal instrumentalities; and in
Gibbons v. Ogden,3 1 he held that Federal power superseded
state power, after Congressional action, even though both
governments had concurrent powers. In the period of Justice
Miller, and Chief Justice Taney, there was substituted, in the
case of Collector v. Day,32 for Federal supremacy, at least in
tax cases, the doctrine of the equality of the states and Fed-
eral Government, and reciprocal immunity from taxation by
either of the instrumentalities of the other. In the present
period of United States constitutional- law the doctrine of im-
munity established by Collector v. Day has been reversed so
as to permit reciprocal taxation by both the states33 and the
United States34 of the instrumentalities of each other. But
3 OUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57 Sup.
Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936) (this case was decided a few weeks before
the West Coast Hotel v. Parrish case, supra note 1.) Imports are im-
mune from state taxation until they are either sold or removed from
the original package, or put to the use for which they were imported.
Hoover & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 65 Sup. Ct. 870 (U. S. 1945).
319 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). -See also -Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
8 Wall. 533, 19 L. Ed. 482 (1869).
3211 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (1871).
33James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208,
82 L. Ed. 155 (1937); State Tax Commission of Utah v. Van Cott,
306 U. S. 511, 59 Sup. Ct. 605, 83 L. Ed. 950 (1939). Many cases fol-
lowing Collector v. Day were overruled.
34Allen v. Regents of University System of Georgia, 304 U. S. 439,
58 Sup. Ct. 980, 82 L. Ed. 1448 (1938); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304
U. S. 405, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427 (1938). Many cases follow-
ing Collector v. Day were overruled.
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these cases did not go so far as to permit the states directly to
tax the property of the Federal Government; and the Supreme
Court has held that this is so, even though Congress is silent
on the subject, and that in cases of prohibition by Congress
the states' power of taxation of the instrumentalities of the
Federal Government can be destroyed.2 These cases seem to
restore the doctrine of Federal supremacy even in the case of
state taxation. Recent cases have not expressly told us
whether or not the Federal Government may still tax the in-
strumentalities of the states and perhaps the states, but the
Supreme Court has recently recognized " the doctrine of Fed-
eral supremacy in tax matters as it was set forth in the case
of McCulloch v. Maryland, and Veazie Bank v. Fenno, so that
it now may be assumed that the doctrine of Federal supremacy
has again been restored, so far as concerns taxation by the
states of the Federal Government, and the instrumentalities
of the Federal Government.
In the case of United States v. Butler,3 7 the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Government could not use a tax power,
although it possessed a general taxing power, if, thereby, it
invaded a *state's police, power, because it would be allowing
Congress to give to itself a police power which had never
been given to it by the Constitution. This case did not say
that the Federal Government could not use its taxing power
for its own police power purposes, nor did it say that the
Federal Government's taxing power did not supersede the
state's taxing power, nor a Federal Government's police power
a state government's police power, nor a Federal Govern-
ment's police power a state government's taxing power. In
Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Company,-8 over the
dissent of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland and Van
3 5Pittman v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 60 Sup. Ct. 15,
84 L. Ed. 11 (1939) (after Congressional prohibition); Mayo v. United
States, 319 U. S. 441, 63 Sup. Ct. 1137, 87 L. Ed. 1504 (1943).
36United States v. Allegheney Coal, 322 U. S. 174, 64 Sup. Ct. 908,
88 L. Ed. 1209 (1944).
37297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312; 80 L. Ed. 477 (1936).
-8301 U. S. 495, 57 Sup. Ct. 868, 81 L. Ed. 1245 (1937).
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Devanter, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Social Se-
curity Act and the state act passed to satisfy the prerequisites
of the Federal act, all on the theory that the Federal Govern-
ment was simply using its taxing power, and was not exer-
cising a police power, by coercing the states. And in Mutford
v. Smith, 39 the court, in an opinion written by Justice Roberts
(who wrote the opinion in United States v. Butler), upheld
the second Federal AAA on the theory that Congress was
regulating marketing, not production, and, therefore, was
regulating interstate commerce and, thereby, was using its
police power in spite of the fact that this act was practically
as sweeping as the first act. The Supreme Court, under this
marketing theory, upheld congressional statutes for further
regulation of agricultural products (milk, wheat) .40 These
cases, therefore, also support the doctrine of Federal su-
premacy.
Any doubt as to the doctrine of Federal supremacy, or the
use of federal tax power for federal police power purposes,
was settled by the case of Sonzinsky v. United States41 in
which the Supreme Court also definitely held that the taxing
power may be used for police power purposes.
Interstate Commerce: Defined
Chief Justice Marshall defined interstate commerce as traf-
fic and transportation (navigation). This continued to be
the definition of interstate commerce until the period of Jus-
tices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter, who
tended more and more to confine commerce to transporta-
tion.42  These later decisions have now been overruled, and
39307 U. S. 38, 59 Sup. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939).
40United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U. S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993,
83 L. Ed. 1446 (1939); H. P. Hood and Sons v. United States, 307
U. S. 588, 59 Sup. Ct. 1019, 83 L. Ed. 1478 (1939); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U. S. 111, 63 Sup. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942).
41300 U. S. 506, 57 Sup. Ct. 554, 81 L. Ed. 772 (1937).
42Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed.
1160 (1936); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935); Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101 (1918). Although
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Marshall's definition of interstate commerce has been re-
stored.43 The decision of Paul v. Virginia,44 which held that
insurance was not commerce, and, therefore, could not be in-
terstate commerce, has now also been overruled by the de-
cision of United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Associa-
tion.45 This decision is certainly correct, but some other
modern decisions have pushed interstate commerce so far-that
there is a suspicion that the Supreme Court has overdone its
work.
Who May Regulate?
The Supreme Court has had as much trouble in discovering
who has the constitutional power to regulate and tax inter-
state commerce as it had in the defining of interstate com-
merce.
Police Power: State
During the period dominated most of the time by Chief
-Justice Marshall, from 1824 to 1852, the states and the Fed-
eral Government had concurrent powers to regulate interstate
commerce. 4 . In this period was decided the License Cases47
which allowed the states to tax the importation into them of
intoxicating liquors, either while the liquors were still in the
original package, or after the original package was broken.
the original package doctrine as to when foreign commerce ends has
now been enlarged so that it reads that such commerce lasts until (1)
the original package has been broken, or (2) there has been one sale,
or (3) the use for which the goods were imported has been accom-
plished, still to sufficiently. state the rule so as to carry out the ideas
of Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Black, it should be added that in
any event immunity from state taxation will last only a reasonable
length of time, as where goods imported are stored and nothing more
is done to them. Hoover & Allison Co. v. Evatt, supra note 30.
43N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup.
Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937); Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301
U. S. 103, 57 Sup. Ct. 650, 81 L. Ed. 953 (1937).
448 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1868).
45322 U. S. 533, 64 Sup. Ct. 1"162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
46Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 31; Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh
Co., 2 Pet. 245, 7 L. Ed. 412 (1829).
475 How. 504, 12 L. Ed. 256 (1847).
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Of course, in such case there would be a Federal supersedure
in case of any Congressional act in conflict with state legis-
lation.
In 1851, and extending to 1894, there was ushered in a new.
period with reference to the powers of regulation of the Fed-
eral and state governments. In the case of Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of Port of Philadelphia,48 the Supreme Court held
that the power of the Federal Government was exclusive over
all matters of interstate commerce national in scope, and left
a concurrent power in the state governments only over mat-
ters of very local interest, like ferries. In this period there
was decided the liquor cases of Bowman v. Chicago and North-
western Railroad Company,49 and Leisy v. Hardin,50 in which
the Supreme Court held that a state could neither forbid the
importation of intoxicating liquors into the state, nor regulate
the sales after they had arrived in the state. Since most of
the Federal Government's power was now exclusive, and the
states were not allowed to regulate interstate commerce even
incidentally, the possibility of Federal supersedure was limited
to the local cases, where the stAte still had a little concurrent
power.
In 1894, in the case of Plumley v. Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts,51 the Supreme Court held that even where the Fed-
.eral Government's power over interstate commerce was ex-
clusive, the states still might exercise a general police power,
if it only incidentally affected interstate commerce; i. e.,
where the primary purpose of the state legislation was to
protect some social interest of the people of the state, and
the interference with regulation of interstate commerce was
very little, the Supreme Court would allow the states to exer-
cise their police power, if it thought the social interest to be
protected thereby was more important than any social interest
to be protected by Federal regulation. After this decision, of
4812 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851).
49125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 31 L. Ed. 700 (1888).
50135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128 (1890).
51155 U. S. 461, 15 Sup. Ct. 154, 39 L. Ed. 223 (1894).
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course, the states could exclude intoxicating liquors, or their
sale in the state, under their general police power, for the
protection of the health of the people of the state,52 if shipped
into the state: and they could regulate shipments of liquor
through the states so far as necessary to protect them against
the use of liquor therein, but, of course, they could not prohibit
through shipments. However, in the case of Edwards v. State
of California,53 the court held that a state could not exclude
a citizen of another state simply on the grounds that he was a
pauper, because in such case there was not sufficient social
interest for the state's police power. Of course, now Federal
supersedure will apply, not only in case of local matters, where
the state's police power is concurrent, but also where the
Federal Government's power of regulation is exclusive but
the states are allowed to exercise their general police power.
Before this third stage in the development of the powers
of the states and the Federal Government there were various
attempts to get away from the holdings of Bowman v. Chicago
and Northwestern and Leisy v. Hardin. After a great deal
of pressure from the dry states, Congress passed the Wilson
act to permit states to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors
after they arrived in the state, and the Webb-Kenyon act pro-
hibiting the shipment of intoxicating liquors in interstate
commerce into dry states. The Wilson act was upheld in the
case of In re Rahrer,54 but the court would not give any satis-
factory rationale for its decision. Of course, the only pos-
sible rationale was that given later in the case of Plumley v.
* Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The Supreme Court upheld
the Webb-Kenyon act in the case of the Clark Distilling Com-
pany v. Western Maryland Railroad Company.55 The ration-
ale for this decision was, of course, that Congress had exer-
52Duckworth v. Arkansas,, 314 U. S. 390, 62 Sup. Ct. 311, 86 L. Ed.
294 (1942); Carter v. Virginia, 321 U. S. 131, 64 Sup. Ct. 464, 88 L.
Ed. 605 (1944); Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U. S. 383, 64
Sup. Ct. 622, 88 L. Ed. 814 (1944).
53Supr. note 10.
54140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572 (1891).
55242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326 (1917).
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cised its own police power, which included the power of pro-
hibition, even though it meant the exercise of a general police
power instead of its police power to regulate interstate com-
merce. Later, Congress passed the Hawes-Cooper act, and
the Ashurst-Summers act, to do for prison made goods exactly
what it did in the Wilson act and the Webb-Kenyon act for
intoxicating liquors; and the Supreme Court upheld both these
prison made goods acts in the cases of Whitfield v. State of
Ohio,560 and Kentucky Whip and Collar Company v. Illinois
Central Railroad Company,57 for the same reasons given in
the liquor cases.
In the first child labor case of Hammer v. Dagenhart,5 8 the
Supreme Court refused to allow Congress to prohibit the
shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured by
child labor. This case was decided long after Plumley v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and was contra, not only to
the case of Clark Distilling Company v. Western Maryland
Railroad Company and Kentucky Whip and Collar Company v.
Illinois Central Railroad Company and other cases like the lot-
tery cases, stolen goods cases, and white slave cases, but the
Supreme Court followed a very narrow and mistaken view of
the Federal Government's power over interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has now realized its mistake and in the
case of United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Company59 has
expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, and thereby estab-
lished the federal commerce power on a broad basis. -
In the case of Di Santo v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,60
the Supreme Court held that a state could not exact a license
of one, not even an employee of a railway company or a steam-
ship company, for selling, in the state, steamship tickets.
56297 U S. 431, 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 80 L. Ed. 778 (1936).
57299 U. S. 334, 57 Sup. Ct. 277, 81 L. Ed. 270 (1937).
58247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101 (1918).
59312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1942). The Supreme
Court has held that the Fair Labor Standards Act did not prohibit child
labor by the Western Union. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot,
323 U. S. 490, 65 Sup. Ct. 335, 89 L. Ed. 289 (1945).
60273 U. S. 34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267, 71 L. Ed. 524 (1927).
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Neither the majority nor the dissenting judges emphasized
the fact that this was an attempt on the part of the state to
regulate foreign commerce. Justice Butler, writing for the
majority, declared the regulation unconstitutional because it
was a direct regulation of foreign commerce. In the later
case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Company61 the Su-
preme Court held that so far as concerns foreign commerce
there is no dual form of government, (quaere, inspection
power) and, therefore, that the states could not regulate
foreign commerce in any way under its general police power.
After both of these decisions the Supreme Court in the case
of State of California v. Thojnpson62 overruled the case of
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania. However, it did not do this on the
ground that a state had a general'police power which it might
exercise even against foreign commerce, for the court did not
overrule the Curtiss-Wright case, but it put its decision on
the ground that a case of interstate commerce was involved.
This places a little doubt on the Curtiss-Wright decision, but
probably the best conclusion to come to is that the Curtiss-
Wright case is still law. Yet in the very recent case of State
of Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad CompanyG3 the Supreme
Court allowed a state, as parens patriae, to sue a number
of railways for injunctive relief against a conspiracy in viola:
tion of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, because it injured the
economy of the state, and the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion did not have jurisdiction, although Chief Justice Stone,
for the dissenters, thought that only the Federal Government
is parens patilae in such cases.
Police Power: Federal
All the time during which the Supreme Court was develop-
ing the law as to the states' power to regulate interstate com-
merce, Congress, of course, always had a specific police power
to regulate interstate commerce; and under this power it
G1Supra note 30.
62313 U. S. 109, 61 Sup. Ct. 930, 85 L. Ed. 1219 (1941).
6365 Sup. Ct. 716 (U. S. 1945).
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could have (1) regulated the persons and instrumentalities
engaged in interstate commerce, (2) regulated goods engaged,
in interstate commerce, (3) prevented obstructions and inter-
ference with interstate commerce, (4) regulated intrastate
commerce when so interblended with interstate commerce
that both had to be regulated by one regulation, (5) fostered
and encouraged interstate commerce. Whether the states'
power was concurrent, as prior to 1851, or the states had no
incidental police power, as between 1851 and 1894, or inci-
dental police power, as after 1894, the Federal Government's
specific police power would have remained the same if it
had wanted to exercise it. As a matter of fact, up until the
eighties, the Federal Government did not enter this field of
regulation. But after the Supreme Court had held that the
Federal Government's power of regulation was exclusive, and
the states could not incidentally regulate under their general
police power, the demand for Federal regulation was so great
that Congress had to take action; and the first form that its
regulation took was the Interstate Commerce Act and the
establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in
1887. Since that time all sorts of statutes have been passed
under its power to regulate interstate commerce and it has
exercised its power in all of the respects cataloged above. In
connection therewith, it has even gone so far as to exercise
a general police power implied from its express specific police
power, as in the lottery cases, white slave cases, and child
goods cases. The Supreme Court has held that the Mann Act
applies to transportation wholly within the District of Colum-
bia. 64 In the case of the Carolene Products Company v.
United States,5 this general police power was extended to
protection against fraud. The development which had been
going on since the eighties has continued since 1937, and
attention will be further called to a few of the cases decided
in this period.
(4United States v. Beach, 65 Sup. Ct. 602 (U. S. 1945).
65323 U. S. 18, 65 Sup. Ct. 1, 89 L. Ed. 13 (1944); Sage Stores Co.
v. Kansas, 323 U. S. 32, 65 Sup. Ct. 9, 89 L. Ed. 21 (1944).
19451
TULANE LAW REVIEW
In Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Company,66 the Su-
preme Court held that "red caps" are engaged in interstate
commerce, and, therefore, can be regulated, as persons en-
gaged in interstate commerce. In the case of Wickard v.
Filburn,67 the court held that Congress could regulate the
amount of wheat to be grown under its power to foster and
encourage interstate commerce. In Santa Cruz Fruit Packing
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,68 the court held that
the National Labor Relations Board may. order the reinstate-
ment and back pay for employees discharged by a cannery
shipping 38 per cent. of its products in interstate commerce
on the theory of preventing obstructions to interstate com-
merce. In Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader,69 the court held
that the restraint on the movement of goods in interstate
commerce resulting from a sit-down strike to influence labor
demands for a closed shop, by compelling a shut-down of the
employer's factory, is not the kind of a restraint of trade or
commerce at which the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is aimed,
because the court held that the conduct must restrain commer-
cial competition. This case overruled the case of United Mine
Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Company70 The Apex
case restored the decision in the case of Appalachian Coals
Incorporated v. United States,71 which had probably been
overruled by the case of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Company.72
66315 U. S. 386, 62 Sup. Ct. 659, 86 L. Ed. 914 (1942).
67Supra note 40. For the power of the I. C. C. to regulate inter-
change of cars and through routes see United States v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 65 Sup. Ct. 471 (U. S. 1945); Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 543 (U. S. 1945).
08303 U. S. 453, 58 Sup. Ct. 656, 82 L. Ed. 954 (1938); Walling v.
IRelmericli & Payne, 323 U. S. 37, 65 Sup. Ct. 11, 89 L. Ed. 1 (1944)
(upheld time and a half pay for overtime).
69310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311 (1940).
70259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975 (1922).
71288 U. S. 344, 53 -Sup. Ct. 471, 77 L. Ed. 825 (1933).
72310 U. S. 150, 60 Sup. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940). Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 58 Sup. Ct. 300, 82 L. Ed. 374 (1938),
and Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T. V. A., 306 U. S. 118, 59 Sup.
Ct. 366, 83 L. Ed. 543 (1939), held that private power companies had
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Taxation: State
Probably before 1885, the states had a power of taxation
of interstate commerce concurrent with the Federal Govern-
ment's specific police power over it. About this time the
Supreme Court held that a state could not directly tax inter-
state commerce, but on this date in the case of Brown v.
Houston,3 it held that a state may exercise its general taxing
power if it only incidentally affects interstate commerce.
Since that time many other forms of taxation by the state
have been permitted if they only incidentally affect interstate
commerce; thus, Coe v. Town of Erro74 held that a state could
tax goods, although already articles of interstate commerce,
if they were at rest in that state, just as Brown v. Houston
held that a state could tax after transportation was over and
they had come to rest in a state, even though interstate com-
merce was not, as yet, over. State of Minnesota v. Blasius75
held that a state could tax goods while they are at rest in the
state after some transportation is over, but more transporta-
tion is to continue. A state may also levy non-discriminatory
property taxes on the property of a person engaged in inter-
state commerce, after property has a situs within the state.76
And the state of domicile of the owner may levy a tax on the
intangibles of an interstate owner,77 and under the unit rule
if tangibles have no fixed situs, a state through which they
move may tax a proportional part of them (and also intangi-
bles in the same proportion).78 A state may also levy license
taxes for the privilege of doing intrastate business even
no immunity from competition by government or governmental cor-
porations.
73114 U. S. 622, 5 Sup. Ct. 1091, 29 L. Ed. 257 (1885). Cf. state
taxation of imports, Hoover & Allison Co. v. Evatt, supra note 42.
74116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715 (1886).
75290 U. S. 1, 54 Sup. Ct. 34, 78 L. Ed. 131 (1933).
76Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 'Sup. Ct.
826, 29 L. Ed. 158 (1885).
77Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15, 55 Sup. Ct. 12,
79 L. Ed. 171 (1934).
78Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct.
876, 35 L. Ed. 613 (1891).
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though by an interstate company, and even though it measures
it in a way that it could not levy the tax ;79 a fee for the use
of state highways and other property ;8o a gross receipts tax
in lieu of property taxes ;sl a net income tax on a domestic
corporation on all its income and on a foreign corporation on
income derived from the state ;82 a use tax8 - and a sales tax
by a buyer state8 4 after transportation into that state; but a
sales tax can not be levied by the seller state on goods shipped
into any other state before transportation. 5  The decisions
since 1937 have only continued the trend which we find before
1937. It is interesting to note that the proper rationale of the
subject of state taxation is the same as the rationale of the
states' police ,power over interstate commerce since 1894.
Of course, the Federal Government under its general taxing
power could tax interstate commerce and the privilege of en-
gaging in interstate commerce, but to-date it has not under-
taken these forms of taxation.
Elections
There has always been some question as to the extent of the
powers of the Federal Government and the states over Fed-
eral elections. The states have generally thought that they
had most of the power (a) because they may prescribe the
times, places and manner for holding elections for senators
and representatives, (b) because the electors in each state
for both representatives and senators must have the qualifica-
-OWestern Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 58 Sup.
Ct. 546, 82 L. Ed. 823 (1938).
SOAero-Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission,
295 U. S. 285, 55 Sup. Ct. 709, 79 L. Ed. 1439 (1935).
8 tUnited States Express Co. v. 'State of Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335,
32 Sup. Ct. 211, 56 L. Ed. 459 (1912).82United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 38
Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135 (1918).
8 3Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 Sup. Ct. 524, 81
L. Ed. 814 (1937).84McGoldrick v. Burwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 60
Sup. Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 565 (1940).
85McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 64 Sup. Ct. 1023, 88
L. Ed. 1304 (1944).
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tions requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the state legislature, (c) because of their power to provide
for the election of electors for the president and for vice-
president, and (d) because until recently the Federal Gov-
ernment has been held to have no power over primary elec-
tions. But the original Constitution gives Congress the power
-to appoint the time and manner of holding elections, and the
Supreme Court now has extended the power of Congress to
primary elections,"' overruling the case of Newberrj v. United
States.87 Congress, consequently, has a very wide power over
elections.. It can legislate to prevent corruption therein, and
is the sole judge of the qualifications of its own members; but
it is questionable whether or not it has the power to make
the poll tax illegal. It has been contended that this poll tax
is a tax and not a qualification for voting, and that voting
of a United States citizen can not be taxed; but voting is not
a privilege of a United States citizen, and even if a poll tax
is a tax, it is a qualification for voting because it has been so
treated throughout United States history. It has also been
contended that Congress would have the power to abolish the
poll tax under its power to provide for the manner of voting
since there has been a lot of corruption in the administration
of the poll tax, through politicians' paying the tax for those
they wanted to vote; but it is a little doubtful whether or
not this power of Congress would override a specific grant
of power over qualifications of voters to the states.
It has now been held8 that political parties are agencies of
the state so that the states may be held liable for any action
by the political parties which are in violation of guarantees
in the Constitution.
Bacnkruptey
The Supreme Court held the first Frazier-Lemke Act un-
constitutional because of the violation of due process of law.8 9
8GUnited States v. Classic, supra note 14.
87Suprm note 15.
s8Smith v. Allwright, supra note 14.
sgLouisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 Sup. Ct.
854, 79 L. Ed. 1593 (1939).
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The second Frazier-Lemke Act, contrary to the first, provided
for public sale; that the mortgagee should retain his* lien and
privilege to bid; and that the farmer who retains possession
must pay rental, but that the act shall apply though the
farmer has only a right of redemption, or conditional sale
contract, or is only the equitable owner. The Supreme Court
upheld the constithtionality of this second act in the case of
Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank.90
This clause applies to state, not Federal acts, and to both
state and Federal judgments, (Federal judgments in state
courts, and state in Federal) but it does not apply to Federal
judgments in Federal courts; but to be entitled to full faith
and credit, a judgment (civil, common law, equity, and declar-
atory) must first be res judicata and second, meet the re-
quirements of due process of law (a) as to jurisdiction, (b)
as to procedure, and (c) as to substance. In the past it has
been held that for jurisdiction for divorce a state must be the
domicile of both parties, or the last matrimonial domicile, or
there must be personal service on the defendant, or he must
appear, or the plaintiff must acquire a separate domicile,
(either because of consent of the other spouse or because of
his or her misconduct).91 Haddock v. Haddock has now been
overruled by Williams v. State of North Carolina92 in which
it was held that separate (bona fide) domicile of one spouse
alone is enough.
So far as concerns the division of powers between the
states and the Federal Government there was no continuous
90300 U. S. 440, 57 Sup. Ct. 556, 81 L. Ed. 736 (1937).
9 1 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867
(1906); Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 ,. Ed. 26 (1939):
92317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942). But more
recently the Court has held that another state may inquire into the fact
of domicile. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092
(U. S. 1945). Also that a judgment for arrears of alimony is final.
Birber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77, 65 Sup. Ct. 137, 89 L. Ed. 114 (1944).
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general judicial trend prior to the period under discussion and
there has been no trend in this period.
9 3
Fundamentals of Democracy
The fundamentals of democracy are (1) self-rule, (2)
equality, (3) liberty, (4) common good. All of these values
of democracy are fully protected by various provisions in our
United States Constitution. Self-rule is protected by the
sovereignty of the people, by the power of amendment, by
universal citizenship and suffrage, by the power of social
control, by the jury system, by the subjection of the military
to the civil authority, by freedom of contract, and by judicial
review. Practically all of these matters have already been'
considered. Equality is protected by the equality clause, the
commerce clause, the interstate privileges and immunities
clause, the due process clause and judicial review. Liberty is
protected by the contract clause, by the writ of habeas corpus,
by the limitations on taxation, by the due process clause, by
our dual form of government, by the separation of powers
and by judicial review. The common good is protected to
some extent (eq. pence) directly by the Constitution but
mostly indirectly by the police powers, powers of taxation,
and the powers of eminent domain of both the states and the
Federal Government, by the constitutional limitations on lib-
erty, and by judicial review. The last three fundamentals of
democracy remain 'to be considered. The fundamental of
the common good is more or less opposed to equality and
liberty. It is impossible to have complete equality and com-
plete liberty and also protect the common good. The protec-
tion of the common good involves a great deal of delimitation
of personal liberty. Hence, these three fundamentals involve
the task of balancing equality and liberty against the common
93Herb v. Pitcairn, 65 Sup. Ct. 459 (U. S. 1945). The Supreme Court
has very recently, not only repeated that a state may tax discrimi-
natorily a foreign corporation not engaged in interstate commerce, but
has treated a foreign insurance company as that kind of a corporation
in spite of the Southeastern Underwriters case. Lincoln National Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 65 Sup. Ct. 1220 (U. S. 1945).
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good so as to give something of all. Since it is impossible
to have all of all, and it would be unwise to have none of any
of them, the only course remaining is to find out just how
much equality and liberty are good for a good society and
just how much social control is necessary for the common
good. The Supreme Court has done most of this work.
Equality
Under the United States Constitution the guarantee of
equality means a guarantee against discrimination, or a guar-
antee of equality of opportunity. It does not guarantee iden-
tity of treatment. This means that the government must in
this respect treat all equally. It also means that the govern-
ment has the power by social control to equalize the oppor-
tunities of all. This kind of treatment is guaranteed as
against the states by the equality clause and the interstate
privilege and immunities clause and the commerce clause, and
against the Federal Government by the due process clause.
This protection extends to Negroes, aliens, and even corpo-
rations if they are engaged in interstate commerce. As
against any or all of these the states and the Federal Gov-
ernment have the power of classifying for the police power,
for taxation, and for eminent domain. But they do not have
the power to pass class legislation.
All of these principles were, of course, developed prior to
1937 and it looks very much as though the protection of
equality is so satisfactory that very little more work needs
to be done on the protection of this fundamental of democ-
racy. But in the case of State of Missouri v. Canada,9 the
94305 U. S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed. 208 (1936). The Supreme
Court has more recently held that the executive and legislative branches
did not intend any discrimination in the west coast exclusion order or
Railway Labor Act. (Dissent, that they could not.) Ex parte Mitsuye
Endo, 323 U. S. 83, 65 Sup. Ct. 208, 89 L. Ed. 219 (1944). The Court
has also held that the Clayton Act, even as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, protects against discrimination caused either by longer
options, or lower prices, or longer periods for deliveries. Corn Products
Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 65 Sup. Ct. 961 (U. S.
1945); Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co.,
65 Sup. Ct. 971 (U. S. 1945).
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Supreme Court, Chief Justice Hughes writing the opinion,
gave a very interesting application of the protection of the
equal laws clause, in holding that the state of Missouri had
violated this clause in failing to give legal education to ne-
groes when it afforded such education to white residents, in
spite of the fact that it had provided for the payment of
tuition for negroes outside the state. The court held that the
duty to refrain from discrimination could be performed only
within the state's own jurisdiction.
Liberty
Through interpreting the guarantees of the original Bill of
Rights and of due process of law, the Supreme Court has
gradually drawn the line between personal liberty and social
control so as, for example, to make the United States Con-
stitution guarantee (1) absolute freedom of thought, (2)
absolute freedom of expression except for slander and libel,
sedition, etcetera, and (3) freedom of action where it does not
interfere with the coordinate freedom of action of fellow
human beings, or with other more important social interests.
Since 1937, the Supreme Court has done considerable work
in the way of really drawing the line between personal liberty
and social control, so as sometimes to protect more personal
liberty, and at other times to allow more social control. In
the period of Justice Miller the Supreme Court held in the
Slaughterhouse Cases,95 that the United States privileges and
immunities clause protected the personal liberty of citizens of
the United States only in respect to a few matters involving
their relation to the national government. This case was
overruled in the period of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Suth-
erland, and Van Devanter, by the case of Colgate v. Harvey,96
which made the United States privileges and immunities
clause cover all the fundamental rights, powers, privileges and
immunities of the Bill of Rights and of the common law. This
put a very important limitation upon the power of social con-
95Supra note 12.
06292 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 80 L. Ed. 299 (1935).
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trol by the states. The later case of Breedlove v. Suttles,9 7
apparently went back to the Slaughterhouse Cases, but it did
not expressly overrule the case of Colgate v. Harvey. In the
case of Hague v. the Committee for Industrial Organization,18
the justices of the Supreme Court again refused to follow
Colgate v. Harvey, only three of the justices holding that a
United States privilege and immunity was involved in the
privilege of peaceable assemblage. But this case also did not
overrule Colgate v. Harvey. However, in the case of Madden
v. Kentucky,99 the court finally expressly overruled Colgate v.
Harvey, and thereby protected personal liberty less, but al-
lowed more opportunity of social control.
In the case of Lovell v. City of Griffin,10 the court extended
the boundaries of personal liberty under due process of law
to include the circulation and publication of leaflets, as well
as newspapers 'and periodicals, as freedom of speech and the
press; and in Thornhill v. State of Alabama 10 and Carpenters
and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's
Cafe 0 2 the court held that freedom of speech included peaceful
picketing, if it takes place at a place where there is a labor
dispute; and in Thomas v. Collins,'"3 that it protects a Union
organizer against licensing if he merely makes a speech at a
mass meeting, and in Republic Aviation Corporation v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board'04 that it gives an employee the
privilege to organize on his own time though in his employer's
factory. Yet in the case of Jones v. City of Opelika,0 5 the
court at first held that freedom of religion does not include
97302 U. S. 277, 58 Sup. Ct. 205, 82 L. Ed. 252 (1937).
98307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939).
9 9 Supr note 11.
100303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938).
101310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940), repudiating
Gitlow v. State of New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L' Ed.
1138 (1925). The clear and present danger test was .extended to con-
tempt in Bridges v. California, supra note 27.
102315 U. S. 722, 62 Sup. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1143 (1942).
103323 U. S. 516, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 340 (1945).
10465 Sup. Ct. 982 (U. S. 1945).
.053i6 U. S. 584, 62 Sup. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691 (1942).
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the privilege of selling religious books and pamphlets without
a license; and in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,10 6 that
it did not include the privilege to refrain from saluting the
United States flag; but in the case of Murdock v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvani, 10 7 the court overruled the Opelika
case; and in Taylor v. State of Mississippi,6 8 and West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,09 the Supreme
Court overruled the Gobitis case so as again to enlarge the
boundaries of the freedom of religion, and to make it uncon-
stitutional to interfere therewith by the means upheld in those
cases. The protection of personal liberty was narrowed a
little by the case of Betts v. Brady,"10 which decided that the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution does not re-
quire the state to furnish counsel, but merely allows the
accused to be represented by his own counsel. Yet in the
case of Williams v. Kaiser,"' the Supreme Court, without ref-
erence to Betts v. Brady, held that due process requires the
appointment of counsel in a capital offense if the accused is
unable to employ counsel, even without a request. But United
States v. White,112 held that the protection against self-crim-
ination is personal, and not available to protect a labor union.
In the very recent case of Cramer v. United States,113 the
Supreme Court protected personal liberty against punishment
for treason by holding that no missing facts can be supplied
by the testimony of the accused, but all facts must be proved
by the testimony of the two witnesses to the overt act claimed
to be treasonable.
The Common Good
The last fundamental of democracy is the common good.
106310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375 (1940).
107319 U. S. 105, 63 Sup. Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943).
108319 U. S. 583, 63 Sup. Ct. 1200, 87 L. Ed. 1600 (1943).
109319 U. S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943).
110316 U. S. 455, 62 Sup. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942).
"'1323 U. S. 471, 65 Sup. Ct. 363, 89 L. Ed. 362 (1945). See also
House v. Mayo, 65 Sup. Ct. 517 (U. S. 1945); White v. Ragen, 65 Sup.
Ct. 978 (U. S. 1945), and Rice v. Olson, 65 Sup. Ct. 989 (U. S. 1945).
112322 U. S. 694, 64 Sup. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542 (1944).
13365 Sup. Ct. 918 (U. S. 1945).
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The only political way to protect the common good, except
directly by the Constitution itself, is through the police power,
the power of taxation, and the power of eminent domain; but
even then in order to protect the common good, as it ought
to be, the scope of the police power, and taxation, and eminent
domain, must be what it ought to be. If too much protection
is. given to personal liberty and equality, not enough can be
given to the common good. We never could have protected
the common good so as to make it anything worthwhile if the
Supreme Court had not put important limitations on all the
guarantees placed in the Constitution for the protection of
personal liberty and equality. If the guarantees in the orig-
inal Bill of Rights, and any additions to it, had not been given
a reasonable interpretation but had been made absolute guar-
antees, there would have been so much personal liberty that
the common good would largely have been destroyed. But the
Supreme Court has found a way of reading in a rule of rea-
sonableness from the common law, so as to qualify all of the
provisions in the Bill of Rights. 114 Thus, for example, it has
made the guarantees of freedom of speech and the press and
religious liberty guarantee only absolute freedom of thought,
qualified freedom of expression, and much less freedom of
action. At first, the Supreme Court, because of the work of
"14The very recent case of In Re Summers, 65 Sup. Ct. 1307 (U. S.
1945) seemed to go too far in this direction. The Court (Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissenting) said that there was no viola-
tion of due process of law where the State of Illinois required an oath
to bear arms as a condition to being admitted to the practice of law,
and upheld denial of admission to a conscientious objector otherwise
highly qualified. This was a limitation of personal liberty, or at least
of equality even if the state was granting a privilege, unless there was
a proper exercise of the police power. Perhaps there was a sufficient
social interest in good lawyers, but it is impossible to see any relation
between the means and the end to be accomplished. The majority relied
upon the naturalization cases. But it is hard to see any relevant
analogy, and even if it was possible to do so, the correctness of these
decisions is very dubious. In addition, a state, in delimiting personal
liberty, or equality, has the burden of showing a proper exercise of
the police power, both in showing a paramount social interest and in
showing some substantial relation .between the means used and the
end to be accomplished.
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Chief Justice Marshall, made the contract clause guarantee
too much personal liberty to corporations, in their charters,
by permitting the granting away of police power, taxation,
and eminent domain; but this has now all been changed by
making the charters of all corporations subject to these
sovereign powers, with the little exception of the power of
taxation. Under Justice Field and his associates, and Justice
Butler and his associates, too much protection was given to
personal liberty and equality under the due process clause by
making various forms of personal liberty, like freedom of
contract, more important than any other social interests. But
this now has also been changed so as to give more weight to
other social interests and thereby to increase the scope of the
police power.
Since 1937, while a few forms of personal liberty and
equality have been protected more than they ever had been
protected before, the general trend in Supreme Court de-
cisions has been in the direction of limiting personal liberty
and increasing those sovereign powers of the government
which would protect the common good. One of the chief ways
whereby this has been accomplished has been by enlarging
the scope of the police power of the states. In the case of
West-Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, supra, the Supreme
Court upheld a state minimum wage law and in doing so over-
ruled the decision of Adkins v. Children's Hospital of District
of Columbia,115 which had declired a federal minimum wage
law unconstitutional; and Morehead v. State of New York,",
which had declared a state minimum wage law unconstitu-
tional. In Olsen v. State of Nebraska,"7 the Supreme Court
enlarged the category of public utilities, and thereby the police
power of the states, so as to allow them to regulate the com-
pensation which may be collected by private employment
agencies from applicants; and overruled the case of Ribnik v.
115261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923).
116298 U. S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. Ed. 1347 (1936).
117313 U. S. 236, 61 Sup. Ct. 8.62, 85 L. Ed. 1305 (1941).
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McBride;"" and in the case of Federal Power Commission v.
,Hope Natural Gas Company,"19 the Supreme Court enlarged
the scope of the states' police power by. permitting the regu-
lation of the rates of public utilities accordipg to the prudent-
investment-rate-base theory, and thereby put to sleep the an-
cient case of Smyth v. Ames. 20 In the same way the Supreme
Court has enlarged the police power of the Federal Govern-
ment by permitting it to exclude from interstate commerce
goods manufactured by child labor, in the case of United
States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Company;'2' by upholding the
second Frazier-Lemke Act, in the case of Wright v. Vinton
Branch of Mountain Trust Bank;122 by enlarging the scope of
interstate commerce and the power of the Federal Govern-
ment to prevent obstructions thereto and to foster and en-
courage interstate commerce, in the case of National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation23
and Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 24
which impliedly overruled a number of cases like Carter v.
Carter Coal Company;' 25 and by making the insurance busi-
ness interstate commerce in the case of United States v. South-
eastern Underwriters Association,1-6 which overruled the case
of Paul v. Virginia.'12 7
The power of the states to legislate for the common good
11"277 U. S. 850, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L.. Ed. 913 (1928).
9320 U. . 591, 64 Sup. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 333 (1943).-
120169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898). More re-
cently it has shown even more liberality in approving other factors for
the determination of the rate base. Market Street Ry. Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 65 Sup. Ct. 770 (U. S. 1945); Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 65 Sup. Ct. 821 (U. S. 1945);
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 65 Sup. Ct.
829 (U. S. 1945); Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. Federal Power Com-
mission, 65 Sup. Ct. 850 (U. S. 1945).
I121Supra note 59.
122Supra note 90. -
2 3Supra note 43.
12 4Supra note 43.
12 5Supra note 42.
126Supra note 45.
'
2 7Supra note 44. See also Bowles v'. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 64
Sup. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944).
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has further been increased by enlarging their tax power so
as to permit multiple taxation, in the case of Curry v. Mc-
Canless,128 which overruled the First National Bank of Boston
v. State of Maine;12 9 and by permitting the states greater
powers of taxation of interstate commerce by a sales tax, in
the case of McGoldrick v. Burwind-White Coal Mining Com-
pany;130 and by a use tax in the case of Henneford v. Silas
Mason Company.131 The Federal Government's power of tax-
ation has been increased specifically by permitting it to levy
an income tax upon the salaries of federal judges in the case
of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 32 which case overruled the cases
of Evans v. Gore133 and Miles v. Graham;34 and generally by
giving a liberal interpretation to its power over estate, gift
and income taxes.- 5 The Supreme Court has also enlarged
the power of social control of the Federal Government by
limiting the power of judicial review of the findings of ad-
ministrative tribunals in such cases as Elmhurst Cemetery
Company of Joliet v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; 36
Federal Power Commission v. Pacific Power and Light Com-
pany; 37 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company v. Adkins,138 and
Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.13 9 In the case
of United States v. General Motors Corporatio2,140 the Su-
preme Court in upholding the Federal Government's power of
128307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339 (1939).
129284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed. 313 (1932).
13OSupra note 84.
131Supra note 83.
'
3 2Supra note 16.
13 3Supra note 18.
.
34Supra note 17.
135Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 65 Sup. Ct. ,508
(U. S. 1945); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fields Estate, 65
Sup. Ct. 511 (U. S. 1945); Choate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
65 Sup. Ct. 469 (U. S. 1945); Fondron v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 64 Sup. Ct. 499 (U. S. 1945); Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue v. Smith, 65 Sup. Ct. 591 (U. S. 1945).
136Supra. note 29.
'
3TSupra note 29.
'
38Supra note 29.
'
39Supra note 29.
140323 U. S. 373, 65 Sup. Ct. 357, 89 L. Ed. 379 (1945).
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-eminent domain defined "property" in terms of rights, and
"taken" in terms of damage. Yet in United States v. Willow
River Power Company,141 and United States v. Commodore
Park,1' the Court made it clear that it was not extending the
meaning of damage to include that caused by the police power,
but only to that caused by a taking by eminent domain.
By way of summary, it may be said that the present Su-
preme Court agrees on the constitutionality of what may be
called the New Deal program. In doing so it did not fol-
low President Roosevelt, but followed the position of for-
mer great justices of the Supreme Court: Holmes, Brandeis,
Stone, Hughes, Cardozo and Miller. All of the present jus-
tices are inclined to uphold social legislation and to give a
liberal interpretation of federal powers, especially in con-
nection with the power to .regulate interstate commerce, so
as to make federal power include the whole of our national
economy. On other questions which have been coming before
the court the justices of the Supreme Court seem to split into
three different groups. Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and
Rutledge may be classed as the most liberal members of the
court; and Justice Frankfurter as the most conservative mem-
ber of the court; while Chief Justice Stone and Justices Jack-
son and Reed may be classed as occupying a position midway
between the other groups. But, however the court may split
according to this classification, it has been able to find a ma-
jority of all of the justices for the opinion that the Supreme
Court should follow a rule of judicial self-restraint in setting
aside legislation, or in reviewing the findings of administra-
tive commissions, or in passing upon state laws; for the pro-
tection of equality and freedom of speech and religious lib-
erty; and for more state and more federal social control of
our economic system, both through the police power and the
power of taxation. The Federal Government has been allowed
to exercise these powers in the field of primary elections, the
14265 Sup. Ct. 803 (U. S. 1945).
14165 Sup. Ct. 761 (U. S. 1945).
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delegation of legislative power, the exercise of a general po-
lice power in connection with interstate commerce, in its con-
trol of foreign commerce, and its taxation for federal police
power purposes. The states have been able to exercise these
powers in connection with the exclusion of intoxicating liq-
uors, goods manufactured by children, in granting divorces,
the regulation of public utilities and in their taxation of goods
shipped in interstate commerce. Hence, whatever else may
be said of the present Supreme Court, it will have to be said
that it is making our Constitution protect democracy and its
fundamentals of liberty, equality and the common good.
